METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ASSESSING THE RUSSIAN MODEL OF BUDGET FEDERALISM FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF ASYMMETRIC ECONOMIC CRITERIA

Abstract

The cooperative model of fiscal federalism is being implemented in the Russian Federation. There are competitive components in the model, mainly in the federal financial subsidies. The authors support the view of the asymmetry of applicable models on political and geographical criteria and argue their view of the asymmetry of models by economic criteria. The authors propose the following economic criteria for assessing the model of federalism: the delineation of powers between levels of power; division of revenues and expenditures of budgets of different levels; the intergovernmental budget relations; policy of subnational and local borrowing. The analysis shows the complete asymmetry of the model of fiscal federalism in Russia: the asymmetry of expenditures, revenues, of the intergovernmental budget relations, subnational and local borrowing. The perspective directions of reforming federalism are formulated for the formation of economic stimuli of independent development in the local territories.