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NIETZSCHE'S "GREAT POLITICS" AND THE AESTHETICIZATION OF POWER: SORTING THE AESTHETIC-POLITICAL DIALECTIC IN "THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA"

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ABSTRACT

Nietzsche's later aesthetics is not simply an expression of "art for art's sake," but is embedded within a political vision he calls the "Great Politics," which fundamentally opposes liberal democracy. This paper challenges dominant Western readings that ascribe liberal democratic commitments to Nietzsche, demonstrating instead that his philosophy envisions a great, kinetic war waged against "those who have not turned out well," a phrase Nietzsche uses broadly for those he deemed unfit. This war is a brutal conflict that rejects the democratic ideal of universal inclusion, even in the variant where agonistic

struggle is necessary to improve all participants. The Dionysian age of art, ushered in by this conflict, is waged by individuals who embrace the creative sacrifice demanded by the will to power, confronting nihilism by recognizing it as rooted in the moralizing falsehood that suffering is "punishment" (a "Lügenwort") and that guilt is irredeemable. Nietzsche identifies this as a lie about humanity's capacity for evolutionary speciation. His concept of tragic pathos begins as an aesthetic experience — an artistic affirmation of suffering — but is transmuted philosophically into the pathos of eternal recurrence, transforming aesthetic affect into knowledge opposing the spiritualization of revenge and leading humanity into the "World of Truth." The internalization of this knowledge is not a universal capability — those designated "unfit" are those excluded from it. The work of art emblemizes this new "World of Truth" and symbolizes humanity's evolutionary potential. The political implications of this transfiguration challenge liberal democracy's premises in any variation. This interpretation resonates with contemporary political currents that embrace conflict as essential for cultural and political renewal. By unifying Nietzsche's aesthetics, politics, and philosophy, this reinterpretation offers a significant contribution to Nietzsche studies and the political theory of aesthetics.

KEYWORDS

interdisciplinary research, aesthetics, political philosophy, conflictology, hermeneutics, Nietzscheanism, will to power

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

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If this will is there (anti-liberal to the point of malice), something like the imperium Romanum is founded: or like Russia, the only power that nowadays incorporates permanence, that can wait, that can still promise something — Russia, the antithesis to the miserable European penchant for small states... [23, p. 113].

Introduction

My paper is a study of Nietzsche's later aesthetics as it is situated in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part II in the chapter "On Those Who Are Sublime" (hereafter, the "Sublime Ones" chapter) as in its place in the broader architectonic of the idea of the will to power as a force that sacrifices life for knowledge. My critical focus is the idea that Nietzsche did not hold that democratization should be a goal of art, or the artistic and that, accordingly, the transfiguration by art is political in furthering democracy. In fact, the texts say exactly the opposite: that the age of art Nietzsche would see ushered in is preceded by the "Great Politics" (*Grosse Politik*). Nietzsche announces the advent of the "Great Politics" as the horizon of a future Europe, a concept that appears explicitly in *Beyond Good and Evil* (§ 208), and is further developed in *Ecce Homo*, his correspondence with Brandes [18, vol. 8, p. 1170] and notably in a *Nachlaß* fragment bearing this exact title [17, vol. 13, p. 25]. The "Great Politics" is a vision of a radical transformation of culture and society and the imposition of the rule of the revaluation on the grounds: (1) that the values of the revaluation are the values that align with our native evolutionary development, and (2) that the values of the revaluation are opposed by the spiritualization of revenge, which is a biopolitical counter-culture. Both points are necessary for the right to rule claimed in the "Great Politics" Nietzsche characterizes his books as springing forth "from a will to life, and with it, as a creation, a real accretion, a surplus of that life is presented" (*aus einem Willen zum Leben, und damit als Schöpfung, eine wirkliche Zuthat, ein Mehr jenes Lebens selber darstellen,*) [17, vol. 13,

p. 23]. Nietzsche's statement about his books indicates that *ein Mehr an Leben* was a lived reality for him, not merely a conceptual idea. He further envisions this vitality as a potential for others as well. For the sake of clarity and brevity, I will refer to this formulation as "*ein Mehr an Leben*" as a reality in Nietzsche's experience and as potential for others and as the locus of the aesthetic.¹

Against the position of Western liberal readings of Nietzsche's aesthetics, Tracy Strong [38] in his book *Friedrich Nietzsche and Politics of Transfiguration* is one such, my paper argues that, in its final form, Nietzsche subordinated his aesthetics to his concept of the "Great Politics" per his explicit statement in *Ecce Homo* ("Books" *Birth of Tragedy* § 4) that the transfiguration of the tragic age of art, at least as regards the musical arts, is by first the force that erupts as the wars of the "Great Politics".² While Strong recognizes that that is the actual textual case [29, p. 171-173], he regards the "Great Politics" as a politics of domination, which it is not, and seems not to take Nietzsche's position seriously that only the "Great Politics" can bring about the transformation that leads to the tragic aesthetic age in Nietzsche's understanding of these matters. In what appears as an ideological overwriting of the text, Strong envisions a version of Nietzsche in which the politics of transfiguration occurs by means of an elite group using aesthetics as a force of democratization. According to Strong, Nietzsche's ideas about art could incline society toward a pluralized and democratic direction through the affirmation of diversity and individuality — achieved by accept-

¹ Also along this same line, see his statement in *Ecce Homo*, "Wise" § 2 that his decadence was "an energizing stimulant to life, to a surplus of life," (*ein energisches Stimulans zum Leben, zum Mehr-leben*).

² Nietzsche's thinking is grounded in his autobiographical experience; he wrote *Ecce Homo* because the misunderstanding of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* reflected a failure of order in exposition. In a letter to his publisher Naumann, he wrote that with *Ecce Homo*, "*Alles in Ordnung*" — that is, everything was now in order in the presentation of his corpus [18, vol. 8, p. 1139], the relevant application here being that first is to come the "Great Politics" and then later the transfiguration.

ing Nietzsche's "invitation" to such affirmation, rather than through the "Great Politics." Strong contends that Nietzsche's aristocratic radicalism fundamentally envisions political and cultural rule by a cultivated elite that advances higher culture and the revaluation of values, explicitly rejecting modern egalitarianism and democratic herd morality. Yet, the notion that this elite's leadership somehow results in a pluralized or democratic social order — even if culturally pluralistic or agonistic — appears contradictory, if democracy is understood as broad political equality or mass participation. This reading leaves no place for fidelity to Nietzsche's account of the decisive role of the "Great Politics" in the transfiguration effected by art. In what follows, I will clarify my own reading of the thought of the aristocratic in Nietzsche and a concept of right to rule.

If Nietzsche did change his mind from some earlier position about aesthetics and politics he did so sooner than the formulations of the "Great Politics" in *Ecce Homo*, as the thinking of the "Great Politics" is already present in the "Sublime Ones" chapter in the form of the warrior of knowledge — the sublime one is the warrior of knowledge, waging the war of the "Great Politics." The "Great Politics" of the late writings is a serious concept, and it quite upsets the idea of a democratized aesthetics in any variation of liberal democracy. Strong and many others maintain that their views align with a broader reading of Nietzsche's philosophy as advocating for experimentation, agonistic engagement, and the flourishing of multiple perspectives. But as I shall argue, the oppositional relationship that counts is the one between the "*décadent*" and the "well turned out human being" (*wohlgeratener Mensch*) — Nietzsche identifies himself as a *wohlgeratener Mensch* and as the opposite of the decadent as such in *Ecce Homo*, "Wise" § 2, and I will track this relationship in the chapter from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* "On Redemption," where the opposition is unmistakably antagonistic and not agonistic. Strong's nod to Nietzsche's critique of liberal democracy and attempted refounding of an idea of

democracy on the idea of the agonistic as a revision of consensual democracy fails. The antagonistic relationship in the "Great Politics" is already in the aesthetics chapter the "Sublime Ones" in the particular that the sublime one is a heroic warrior of knowledge — hence the "Great Politics" — who precedes the "Over-hero" (*Überheld*) in whom power is manifested in the "visible" (*in's Sichtbare*), which is Nietzsche's definition there of beauty. The politics of societal transfiguration in Strong's understanding does not bring with it a right to rule, and lack of clarity about what the meaning is of "politics" in his discussion is the result.

In the aesthetic thinking in the "Sublime Ones" chapter, aesthetics is contracted to his idea of the Dionysian (from his earlier dialectic of the Apollonian/Dionysian dialectic) and as the manifestation of the will to power in the perceptible. The perceptible refers to the world as become "thinkable, seeable and feelable" by the force of the "Great Politics" that overthrows the world of the spiritualization of revenge of the decadent and his mendacious statement that the creative suffering in the sacrifice of life for power is a "punishment." "Punishment" is the decadent's "lying word" (*Lügenwort*), and the psychology of the idea is cathected with revengefulness. The world transformed to be "thinkable, seeable and feelable" by the will to power is "The World of Truth," (*die Welt der Wahrheit*) as Nietzsche names it, in contrast to the mendacity of the decadent that occludes such. The "World of Truth" is set in place by the warrior of knowledge in the "Sublime Ones" chapter, and the world of art is emblematic of this transformation. Art does not produce this transformation; it is factual in the texts that the order is, first, the "Great Politics" and the transformation of the world to the "World of Truth," and later the work of art now as emblematic of that world. The arc of development in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Part II from the "World of Truth" as "thinkable, seeable and feelable" of *ein Mehr an Leben* to the work of art as the manifestation of the will to power in the *visible* shows the architectural coherence

of the book in this area. This is the development stated explicitly in *Ecce Homo*: that the tragic age of art, Dionysian Art, will appear only after the wars of the "Great Politics" because these wars will bring a "excess of life" (*Zuviel des Lebens*) and that will make the tragic pathos of joy in the suffering of the sacrifice of life possible. Strong's position is easily refuted on these grounds.¹

It is not art that transforms the world in Nietzsche but rather, the "Great Politics" that comes before it. The wars of the "Great Politics" will bring about a great *Zuviel des Lebens*, and there will be a Dionysian age of art because these will be wars unlike any others in that we will not suffer from them — whence the Dionysian Age. What this means is that, *pace* Strong and many others, art does not transform the world but is just the emblemization of that transformation. What does bring the transformation is a most undemocratic politics. The world transfigured is the world as the will to power transformed from the world under the rule of the decadent. The politics of Nietzsche's aesthetics is based on what the "Great Politics" signifies, which is the revaluation of all values, and it is not democratic politics.

¹ Along this same line of textual infidelity to the study of the "Great Politics" by Nietzsche's commentators may be mentioned the work of Rosi Braidotti [2; 3]. Braidotti's approach to Nietzsche is a politically motivated reinterpretation rather than an attempt at textual fidelity. It cannot be refuted, any more than it seeks textual confirmation. She isolates Nietzsche's concepts (e.g., *Übermensch*, will to power, eternal recurrence) from their elitist frameworks to align them with posthumanist and feminist egalitarianism. For example, Nietzsche's *Übermensch* is a hierarchical figure transcending the "herd" but Braidotti reimagines it as a symbol of trans-species solidarity, emphasizing connectivity, despite Nietzsche's explicit call for the "Great Politics" of war; Will to Power: Nietzsche ties this to antagonistic hierarchy, in just so many words, but Braidotti recasts it as relational vitality, a force driving non-hierarchical becoming, and precisely the opposite is the case, as a glance at any text of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* makes evident. Braidotti's "nomadic subjectivity" borrows Nietzsche's fluidity but discards his aristocratic telos to *Übermenschlichkeit*. This is a hermeneutic violence against Nietzsche — severing his concepts from their original context to serve alternate, even opposing, ideological agendas. This is a case of Western narrative control seeking to dominate the interpretation of what Nietzsche truly imparts.

The revaluation of all values is normative in whatever sense it is meaningful to say, normatively, that species should evolve, that species should speciate. The "Great Politics" is an anti-philosophy of politics to the degree that it is anti-ethical, it proceeds from a non-ethical normativity.

World Transfiguration: From Nihilism to "The World of Truth"

Several texts in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* present the idea of the will to power in its role as a creative force producing knowledge, a world of knowledge, and Nietzsche uses the phrase "The World of Truth." These texts are in Part II: "Upon the Blessed Isles," "On the Tarantulas," "On the Famous Wise Men," and "On Self-Overcoming" (hereafter, the "Blessed Isles," "Tarantulas," "Famous Wise Men," and "Self-Overcoming" chapters, respectively). In "Blessed Isles," Nietzsche presents the will to power as a creative force that produces a world we can know and understand. This creative will of a "World of Truth" is not merely a passive or reactive force but an active, generative one that seeks to create a world "humanly thinkable, humanly visible, and humanly feelable." (*Menschen-Denkbares, Menschen-Sichtbares, Menschen-Fühlbares*), and that is a will to truth because the truth should be such, the truth is human-centered. The "World of Truth" signals the emer-

² See this variant text to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part II, the "Self-Overcoming" chapter: "Thus, there is neither good nor evil, which would be imperishable: everything must always overcome itself anew. With your values, you wield force, you value-creating ones: and this is your creative will out of hidden love. But a stronger force grows out of your values, and there eggshells break. Thus, my friends, life itself taught me about its secret; therefore I had to become the destroyer of your good and evil. Let us speak only out of truth! What does it matter if we ourselves are shattered by the truth, this terrible thing! May truth shatter us! May the world be shattered by the truth! (and break into pieces)! That I create a new world, the World of Truth. May the world be shattered by our truths — so there is a new world to create! For, my friends, if truth does not want to build the world anew, what does truth matter!" [17, vol. 14, p. 302]. For readability, I have omitted bracketed material and quoted only Nietzsche's final, unedited text, and I have combined variants.

gence of the revaluation of values. In it, what is true, “the thinkable, seeable and feelable” is at the surface, whereas in the world of lies of good and evil, what should be thought and seen and felt is being concealed. The concealment is the lying. How is the truth being concealed and why?

In the aesthetics of the “Sublime Ones” chapter, the creative will of knowledge is introduced in the figure of the hero of knowledge who is sublime in being decked out in ugly truths as the ornamentation of the sublime, and he must give way to the “Over-hero.” But what knowledge is this, and if presenting a “World of Truth” is meant rhetorically in opposition to some other world where truth is not expressed, and maybe even suppressed, what world is that? In the “Sublime Ones” chapter, the definition of beauty (very non-Kantian) [9] is: “When power becomes gracious and descends into the visible (*in's Sichtbare*), that alone I would call beauty” [20, p. 230]. The work of art presents the “World of Truth” and we can see the exercise of knowledge remaking us so that we pass from the sublime, where we still reel from ugly truths, to the “Over-hero” when the knowledge learned is applied as the exercise of power in a self-mastery become *visible*.

In the “Blessed Isles” chapter Nietzsche presents the will to power as a creative force that produces a world in which we are first free to know [20, p. 197-200]. We learn that as “lovers of knowledge” (*Erkennenden*), we are not meant to be born into a world that is “incomprehensible” (*Unbegreifliche*) or “irrational” (*Unvernünftige*). To the end of a new birth into a new world we know through and through, we are enjoined to create it: “and what you have called world, that shall be created only by you” with the “creative will” (*schaffender Wille*).

In the “Self-Overcoming” chapter, Nietzsche begins by telling us that the love of knowledge is not something in itself but something *per aliud*, a drive that follows the service of the will to power, and that is why we love it because the growth of power (by knowledge) is happiness. He tells us that the will to truth — what

truth? — is a will to power that seeks the “thinkability of all beings” (*Denkbarkeit alles Seienden*). He writes: “And you too, lover of knowledge, are only a path and a footprint of my will,” and that the “will to power walks also on the heels of [the] will to truth” [20, p. 227]. In “On Old and New Tablets,” he says: “to gain knowledge is a joy for the “Lion-willed” (*Löwen-willigen*)” [20, p. 318]. Zarathustra’s striving, as he presents it in the chapter “On Redemption” is to “compose into *ein Dichtes* what is fragment, riddle and dreadful accident” in us.¹ Although by this we cannot become the *Übermensch*, we can become forebears of him. That is a possible objective and so we are not in an incomprehensible world after all, but a purposed one, humanly purposed. However, we are concealing that knowledge, lying about the fact that we, as all living things, are called to speciate. Speciation is what the will to power is ultimately trying to achieve by cutting into life for knowledge. The will to power is “the inexhaustible, generative will of life,” (*der unerschöpfte zeugende Lebenswille*). The “Lion-willed” faces himself, and it is his knowledge come of life cut into itself to bring out its intimate weaknesses that makes his self-overcoming possible, and so his self-knowledge is his first joy and why he loves it. The inexhaustible will to power enables us to become knowers of ourselves and masters of ourselves, enabling us to grow in power over our intimate weaknesses in life and strengthen life to reach *ein Mehr an Leben*, which is speciation. Speciation does not end. What we see in the astounding diversity of life around us just is the force of speciation.²

¹ See Nietzsche F.W. “Beyond Good and Evil” [24, p. 257] on the decadence of fragmentation versus wholeness.

² Edgar Landgraf [13] and earlier critics, Svätöpluk Štúr [31] have criticized Nietzsche’s vitalism. In the case of Štúr, his argument is a non-sequitur: it does not follow that Nietzsche should not have been a vitalist on the grounds that vitalistic thinking of a naturalized will to power can be appropriated to support bad ideologies, which is the premise of Štúr’s consequentialist ethics [6]. This sentence from the “Self-Overcoming” chapter captures Nietzsche’s view: “I (life) am *that which must always overcome itself*. Indeed, you call it will to procreate or a drive to an end, or something higher, farther, more manifold: all this is one and one secret” [20, p. 227]. The statement is

The strengthening of life undertaken by the *wohlgeratener Mensch* is essentially interior; the agency of will to power is in terms of the interior self, not the exterior

vitalistic but it would seem *prima facie* to be a representation of a true fact and not a value statement of philosophy subject to censure. Landgraf's reading is that the concept of will to power in the later Nietzsche builds on an earlier conception of will as an emergent property of simpler instinctual processes [13, p. 77]. Landgraf's book positions Nietzsche as a precursor to posthumanism by focusing on emergent properties and distributed agency applied to Nietzsche and willing developed from the life sciences of his time. Landgraf's book does not engage with the idea of the creative will to power as articulated in the doctrine of eternal recurrence in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. There is not a single mention in his book of the idea of the creative will in willing the eternal recurrence as presented in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* to back up the "built upon" claim, and surely it is not obvious that Nietzsche "built" the idea of creative willing, creating *ein Mehr an Leben*, as a rupture off the stasis in the main lineage by saying "Yes" to the suffering in the sacrifice of life for power from Wilhelm Wundt. "*Der Wille ist ein Schaffender*," says Zarathustra (Part II "*Von der Erlösung/On Redemption*"). Nietzsche himself dates the idea of the eternal recurrence to August 1881, and this is after his book *Daybreak* that contains his main published section on insect sociality in § 206 of which Landgraf makes much (unnecessary) ado [13, p. 73]. Landgraf does not answer — and perhaps cannot answer — how Nietzsche conceptually built the theory of creatively willing the eternal recurrence on the emergent/distributed conception of will. After all, if the ill will against the will to power is activated by collective impulse, then so is the creative will to will the eternal recurrence. But then how could the ill will ever have appeared to begin with since it would always already have been superseded by the higher collective creative will? Landgraf's book is highly selective, by his own statement of method, explaining his omission by stating to be writing for posthumanists who can profitably engage in discussions with Nietzsche as he says in his introduction [13, p. xiv] (so by implication, leaving it an open question whether profitable engagement with the Nietzsche of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is even to be had for posthumanists). By that logic, Landgraf's book could be the start of a whole series: next up maybe *Socrates' Posthumanism*? The will to power is creative in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: it is individual, autonomous, interiorized, agential, and hierarchical. The suggestion that the idea of the will to power as presented in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is not creative and vitalistic is absurd. Landgraf's methodical omissions and narrowly targeted engagement confine his study to a circle of posthumanist discourse, leaving unaddressed the central vitalist and creative dimensions of Nietzsche's idea of the will to power that remain indispensable for any serious philosophical investigation of his later works. The idea that Nietzsche anticipated posthumanism by conceiving the will to power as non-autonomous and non-agential is the *ne plus ultra* of posthumanist ideological falsification — the ultimate example of distortion and unlikely to be surpassed.

self. His primary intention is to exercise and strengthen life in himself by will to power coming into increasing mastery of its intimate weakness. That is his absolute existential premise. But the ill-willed decadent mendaciously tries to make out that the will to power is exteriorized as a force of domination. The exercise of will to power is amoral and it does lead to violating the moral law, (as *per* Kant's understanding of it), but it is only in the mind of the decadent that that is the primary intention. For the *kleine Menschen*, "those who have turned out badly" (*Schlechtweggekommene*), the will to power seems like a malevolent force intruding disruptively on their secure lives, precarious as they are, and the sacrifice of life for power is unendurable and they have turned against it. This is a *precis* of Nietzsche's empirical analysis of the morality of the slave oppressed by "masters" that his moralizing is revenge psychology against will to power itself, that it is will to power that he most hates and despises for its exaction of sacrificing life. That is an important point of clarification.¹

A variant to the text we have just been studying, in the "Self-Overcoming" chapter contains a passage describing the "World of Truth," (*Die Welt der Wahrheit*) cited above [17, vol. 14, p. 302]. The sense of the term "World of Truth" is truth as opposed to the mendacity of the decadent in his spiritualization of revenge and his *Lügenwort* of punishment, and is not a reference to an objective truth. In Nietzsche's philosophy, the "World of Truth" is the totality of the knowledge that affirms and guides the will to power in its becoming master over our intimate weaknesses. Will to power cuts into life to sacrifice life for knowledge of how to do so, as *per* its requirement. It is knowledge of ourselves as such knowledge relates to the rupture of speciation as we are called to overcome ourselves, and we have it as acquired by the will to power cutting into life, sacrificing life for power. So it is not just any

¹ The so-called "Lenzer Heide Fragment," (dated June 10, 1887) which Nietzsche composed on walks on the moors outside Lenz, Germany contains a valuable summary of reactive slave-to-master psychology [26, p. 27-30].

knowledge but empirical knowledge that we are called to a speciation rupture, as are all living things, and that speciation requires a terrible suffering against self-preservation. Our moment of conscience is to acknowledge that we have created a *Lügewelt* — to coin phrase not explicitly to be found in Nietzsche but that is still Nietzschean — of the spiritualization of revenge against the will to power's creative sacrificing of life in the concepts of guilt and punishment to conceal the biological imperative of speciation. That is what we are lying about and it is not something that can be understood within virtue theory; Nietzsche's study requires a non-philosophical, empirical premise. The decadent's mendacity opposes that knowledge, and that is why the spiritualization of revenge, our *lebensfeindlichkeit* against the will to power, is a *politics* against life. What is driving the decadent's mendacity to create a system of thought of revenge spiritualized — the system of thought that has "so far been the subject of man's best reflection" — is that speciation, unlike as Darwin thought, is a rupture, and that is a painful and terrifying thing.

In the "Famous Wise Men" chapter Zarathustra instructs the renowned wise men in his Dionysian wisdom. He writes: "Spirit is the life that itself cuts into life; with its own agony it increases its own knowledge" [20, p. 216]. This insight, rooted in the lived experience of self-overcoming, is something the wise men, bound by merely philosophical wisdom, do not and cannot know. When Zarathustra asks, "Did you know this, you famous wise men?" he is highlighting that his Dionysian insight is something they cannot know because it is not accessible through traditional philosophy or intellectual abstraction. The will to power, according to Nietzsche, compels us to know our intimate weaknesses, setting us back in life so that we may gain knowledge of how to strengthen against them — they need to be exposed first and self-studied. The line, "life sacrifices itself for power" [20, p. 227] refers to an interior state of suffering in which our most profound vulnerabilities are exposed. This sacrifice of life is intended to

lead to knowledge of how to strengthen life against its own weaknesses, recognizing that we are beings of "limbs and fragments" not composed beings unless and until by means of the advent of the *Übermensch*.

"Life is sacrificed for power" is an empirical statement, not a conceptual one. It is a claim about how living beings actually behave and evolve, testable through observation rather than by abstract philosophical analysis. It is something we can know. There is no philosophical competence in conceptual analysis that can assess it; it is not a product of philosophical thinking as traditionally understood. This core theory of Nietzsche locates his thinking outside the conventional boundaries of philosophy. Nietzsche's whole discussion of knowledge in these sections is anti-philosophical.

In an 1884 *Nachlaß* text, Nietzsche writes about the Dionysian Wisdom that characterizes the highest type of human being. He writes that the world as he would wish to see it has emblazoned over it the principle of "the greatest possible stupidity," (*Princip der größtmöglichen Dummheit*) the *Übermut* symbol: "God as devil and *Übermut* symbol" [25, p. 197]. That is because this is the world in which will to power is everywhere turned against self-interest/self-preservation in pursuit of its advance. The idea is that will to power brings devilry and devilment into our lives so that we can study ourselves as being creatures of "fragment, riddle and dreadful accident." Life is sacrificed, cut into, by will to power for knowledge of life's intimate weaknesses that we can apply to self-overcoming and grow in power and strengthen aliveness in ourselves, become more alive, even to surplus life, meaning, life above and beyond what is needed to meet the exigencies of survival, a very non-Darwinian thought. Growing in power and strengthening aliveness is speciation. This is also the world Nietzsche presented as his "mirror" in *The Will to Power* [19, § 1067]. It is the world as it reflects himself in his self-overcoming, the action of will to power sacrificing life, cutting into it for knowledge, the force of speciation. It is

the “World of Truth” and as is opposed to the world of lies of the decadent.

Will to power forces us to take the path of the greatest possible stupidity in our lives, throwing our secure lives into turmoil, sacrificing life for power. We are at the mercy of the will to power in this way; life is sacrificed so that its intimate weaknesses may be brought into focus and knowledge acquired of how to strengthen life in ourselves against them and will power to grow, till the rupture of speciation to begin. But, the decadent has set himself to reject this reality of life and to renounce his future in becoming the forerunner of the *Übermensch*. Nihilism is the result.

In a *Nachlaß* text titled: “New Order of Rank: Preface to the Philosophy of Eternal Recurrence” [25, p. 197] already referred to, rank order is divided into three groups for a total of ten divisions, and the highest is the Dionysian wisdom to feel that suffering is necessary. This is the suffering of being crushed again and again and the devilry of being set on the most difficult paths. The feeling of necessity comes forth because it happens over and over, and that feeling of necessity is itself the creative force of will to power (as whereby will to power grows and life becomes stronger against its intimate weakness). The feeling of necessity is emphasized, necessity is not a noesis but issues from the relentless creative force of will to power cutting into life. The feeling of necessity as arising from the relentlessness of life cutting into itself again and again is the feeling of creative suffering being worthy of eternal recurrence. This subsection is titled “Inequality of Human Beings,” and this is the highest type [25, p. 195-197]. The feeling of power growing, the feeling of resistance overcome is the source of our authentic happiness, as we learn in *The Antichrist* § 2 [22], which is Nietzsche’s authentic happiness as he states in the opening sentence of *Ecce Homo*, “Why I Am So Wise.” His happiness puts the lie to the fake happiness of the *kleine Menschen* and the fake culture of nihilism. We find this contrast in “Zarathustra’s Prologue,” in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*,

section § 4 in which Zarathustra relates his litany of what in human beings he loves most, among which we read: “I love him who is abashed when the dice fall to make his fortune, and asks, ‘Am I then a crooked gambler?’” [20, p. 127]. The path of the greatest possible stupidity against our self-preservation, the sacrifice of life, provides us with knowledge of our intimate weaknesses and how to overcome ourselves, and the feeling of power over ourselves. On the other hand, in the next section of “Zarathustra Prologue,” § 5, we read of the *kleine Menschen* — “the last humans,” “the beginning of the end” — who believe that in their dereliction in self-overcoming they have found happiness: “We have invented happiness” they say, but it is the happiness of the idiot as Zarathustra indicates as being such as after each such declaration he writes of them: “und Sie blinken”.

Another statement of *Übermüt* devilry occurs in the published writings in *Beyond Good and Evil* § 36 and § 37. In section § 36, Nietzsche argues to the imaginary interlocutor that the world is will to power and he is too. But in the next section, § 37, the interlocutor objects: “God is refuted but not the Devil?” and Nietzsche’s answer is in the form of a rhetorical question. The interlocutor is making a popular objection, but Nietzsche asks, “Oh, for the devil’s sake, who is forcing you to use popular expressions anyway!” [24, p. 40]. The answer is that it is the devilry of will to power that is doing so, as he, the interlocutor, will soon learn as his obtuseness to what is being said about himself (that he is will to power and nothing else besides) is leading him to a rude awakening, as he stumbles forward on the path of the greatest possible stupidity it is setting him on by way of getting him to figure that out.

Nietzsche’s critique of Darwin then is not merely about values, but about the very process of change and transformation in life. For Nietzsche, speciation — the emergence of new forms of life — is not a gradual, incremental process, as Darwinian evolutionary theory holds. Instead, Nietzsche conceives of specia-

tion as a *rupture*: a violent, discontinuous break that demands a radical reordering of existence. This understanding of speciation as rupture and not as incremental has profound implications for Nietzsche's "Great Politics." The great political division is not between those who hold different values, but between those who can bear the awful rupture of speciation — the terrifying, life-altering transformation — and those who cannot. Those who are unable to endure this rupture become "hostile to life" (*lebensfeindlich*) turning against the force that drives speciation: the will to power. This is not a matter of choosing values, but a matter of a fundamental disposition: some human beings are capable of facing the rupture while others, overwhelmed by its demands, become hostile to life and resist transformation. This distinction runs deeper than morality or ideology — it is rooted in the biological and existential conditions of human existence. Opposed to the "World of Truth," and as biopolitics against speciation, the *Lügewelt* of the decadent malevolently undermines the force of speciation in its awful rupturing that begins with the terrible sacrifice of life cutting into itself for knowledge. The *Lügewelt* of the decadent is in his spiritualization of revenge in the concepts of guilt and punishment.

Guilt and Punishmen as the *Lügenworte* of the *Kleiner Mensch*

Nietzsche envisions a world transformed, but what makes for the transformation is the success of his politics, his "Great Politics." What does it mean to call it politics? What is the politics on the other side of the transformation he is envisioning? Nietzsche's realization that our being *lebensfeindlich* against the will to power as the force of speciation is a kind of politics against it is the starting point of his political thinking. However, it is obviously not a philosophical starting point, and we have to expand our study and become interdisciplinary to come to terms with what it is. This will mean a paradigm shift in how Nietzsche is to be read. But, it may

be noted in passing, this is unlikely to happen because philosophy remains fundamentally subjective and self-involved — a discipline that, as J.O. Wisdom observed, expresses unconscious needs and motivations through its arguments, and is not likely to suddenly abandon this inward focus to engage directly with objective or empirical reality [32]. This was also the metaphilosophical opinion of Morris Lazerowitz, who quite admired Wisdom's monograph.

We are *lebensfeindlich*, rooted in nihilism and self-destructive. But why would that happen, and how did it happen? Is it a moral failing? Did Nietzsche come to improve us morally? What could it possibly mean that being *lebensfeindlich* is unethical? Is it because life is good, and is that because creation is good? And how come Nietzsche knows this and we do not? Is he a Messianic figure with a purer heart than we who are "in bondage to sin," or some such, and so have not been able to make this step for ourselves? This is pure nonsense, philosophical talking in a circle: affirming life is "noble" if that is what noble means, and this circularity plagues all philosophical discussions about Nietzsche as a "legislator" of values. If he is so, it is certainly not because of some special philosophical genius at *a priori* thinking. So, let us begin by asking these questions from a scientific point of view, reading Nietzsche's statements as proto-biology. What exactly are we set against in being *lebensfeindlich* and is there a naturalized sense of 'should' in which we should not be?

It is clear from the texts by the term *lebensfeindlich*, Nietzsche means renunciation of the will to power, so we must ask what it is that will to power demands in terms of evolution that there would be such hatred and such great despising of it, as Nietzsche recognized [17, vol. 12, p. 9]. It suggests a dualism, but what would such a dualism be? The answer lies in Nietzsche's recognition, as stated in *Ecce Homo*, that there is dual lineage in our species — he finds it in himself — and it is what he calls his "*doppelte Herkunft*". The phrase appears in his autobiographi-

cal introduction *Ecce Homo* (Chapter 1, "Why I am So Wise," section 1) which was to be the introduction to his *Hauptwerk*, the successor work to *The Will To Power*, *The Revaluation of All Values*. One strand of Nietzsche's lineage is from his father, but the second lineage is a rupture from that line of stasis. This is proto-biological thinking that resonates strongly with the theory of speciation by rupture and of mainline stasis first presented by Gould and Eldredge in 1972 [8]. Nietzsche was an evolutionary theorist, just as was Darwin, although not a formal naturalist necessarily, but a keen conceptual thinker, and he recognized that what he was experiencing in his own case and seeing born out in the world around him suggested a dual structure of *lebensfeindlichkeit* in a parent lineage of succession on the one hand and rupture from it the another. The fundamental idea of evolution is speciation, after all, and what Nietzsche uncovered that was so sharply anti-Darwinian was that mainline stasis is actively static, that we are actively opposing the will to power's activity of sacrificing life that brings about speciation, and that this is why there is nihilism. Incremental steps do not result in a new species; speciation is not an effortless and semi-automatic process that we just follow along as in Darwin. Rather it is rupture and it is difficult and painful, and we ultimately become *lebensfeindlich* because it is so. His study that we are *lebensfeindlich* is a framing of a concept of biopolitics against speciation as a rupture from mainline stasis of self-preservation.

Nietzsche's study of guilt and punishment in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part II, "On Redemption" approaches them as expressions of our *Lebensfeindlichkeit*, as ideas in a revengeful system of thought directed against the will to power in a spiritualized form. It is a study of the active politics against speciation, and its mechanism in will to power. Guilt and punishment in the spiritualization of revenge focus on the meaning of the suffering in the sacrifice of life for power, which is essential for the growth of power. Using deception as to the meaning of suffering by the will to power sacrificing life to grow, revengeful-

ness hopes to thwart the agency of will to power. The decadent's revengefulness is against the will to power.

Will to power cuts into life, sacrifices life, to acquire knowledge for us of how to grow in power over life's intimate weaknesses, (being "fragment, riddle and dreadful accident") setting us, (hopefully, in fact!) again and again on the path of the greatest possible stupidity. From the perspective of self-preservation, which is the perspective of the "small human being" (*kleiner Mensch*) what is "fragment riddle and dreadful accident" is better left untouched. The decadent cannot engage the suffering of will-to-power's "devilish pranks" that sacrifice life in preparation for the will to power growing and aliveness becoming stronger. He cannot take the step that life is sacrificed as a necessity. Unlike "those who have turned out well," (the *wohlgeratene Menschen*) the decadent *does* believe in misfortune and guilt. That is his self-deception. But this then means that the self of "fragment, limbs, and dreadful accidents" stays as is. To get the decadent to engage with the necessity of life sacrificed over and over again for power, he must learn to want the past of the sacrifice of life. He must come to feel it as a necessity; the feeling that it *must* recur should itself form out of the fact that the creative sacrifice happens again and again, and as itself (this feeling) the manifestation of the will to power. However, while Nietzsche 'invites' the decadent to embrace this radical necessity — the eternal recurrence of life sacrificed repeatedly for power — it must be admitted that most will refuse this 'invitation'. Those who reject the demand to will the endless sacrifice of life for power will find themselves bruised and broken in the merciless wars of the "Great Politics" and its right to claim rule, *pace* even revised versions of an agonistic conception of democracy, such as Strong's.

The decadent's idea that his suffering is a punishment is a revengeful thought, it is a lie, a *Lügenwort*, as Zarathustra characterizes it. He believes it is a just punishment for guilt, and he believes so in order that he can have a good conscience about

his dereliction in not undertaking what we are all called to do but which none have (whence the subtitle of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: "For All and None"), which is to become forerunners of the *Übermensch*. The decadent's thought that suffering is a punishment is revenge psychopathology, a lie cathected with revenge against the will to power, and a hypocritical lie because it tries to conceal itself in good conscience.

The *kleiner Mensch* executes his revenge on the will to power in the *wohlgeratener Mensch* by getting him to believe in the same way as himself, thus confusing him about the meaning of will to power stimulus suffering and stand down from the project of his self-overcoming to the growth of will to power and stronger aliveness. We are still one species after all, and the *wohlgeratener Mensch* is very liable to be tipped back into the revengeful thinking of the *kleiner Mensch*. The *kleiner Mensch* tries to create confusion about the meaning of the suffering in the rupture of speciation, to lie about there even being such a thing as speciation, to deny it. He tries to enforce blinding to it in others. In getting the *wohlgeratener Mensch* to believe the same way as himself in the thinking of the spiritualization of revenge, the decadent seeks to assure that the exercise of will to power in him will be thwarted, and that is his revenge. Revenge is against the will to power, it arises in reaction to the force of speciation. In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche says that, as himself a *wohlgeratener Mensch*, he does not believe in either misfortune as being punishment or guilt [21, p. 221]. That is not meant to be an absolute statement but particularized to reject the lying thought of the decadent, and it is key to his *wohlgeratenheit* that, as the opposite of the decadent, he has not adopted the decadent's psychopathology of spiritualized revenge. Nietzsche's assertion that he does not believe in either misfortune or guilt is to some extent exemplary and declamatory, but it is not just a bravura statement, and the point is to allow him to affirm the untoward past. But this does not mean affirming it as a noesis of some

sort of mindless (because unintelligible) total affirmation of existence, but because the untoward past as a creative sacrifice of life is in a dynamical relationship to evolution. The *wohlgeratener Mensch*, can accept the necessity of suffering understood as the sacrifice of life for the growth of power over our intimate weaknesses, but it is not a given that he can and he is vulnerable to the revengeful attack of the decadent.

The relationship between the decadent and the *wohlgeratener Mensch* is adversarial. The decadent is the adversary of the *wohlgeratener Mensch*, and the latter is vulnerable to the former. Well-turned-outness is more the lucky hit than the norm, and it is frail. The *wohlgeratener Mensch* is capable of engaging the suffering inherent in will to power growing and in strengthening life against its intimate weaknesses (which is speciation), but the revengeful ill-will of the decadent zeroes in on that moment and tries to trick the *wohlgeratener Mensch* into believing that his suffering is *not* creative will to power suffering and something he should embrace, but a punishment and he guilty and, in that guilt, he must stay bound to that suffering and not seek will to power's strengthening of itself against it. Getting him to back off from his effort at self-overcoming is how the ill-willed decadent accomplishes his revenge against the will to power. It is revenge against the terrible force of the rupture of our speciation.

Nietzsche's texts are clear about this antagonistic relationship. In "On Redemption" we learn that the ill-willed decadent is revengeful on "all who can suffer," meaning on all in whom the will to power is functioning as it should to strengthen life in us by the creative suffering in life being sacrificed. The will has turned from being a "liberator," (*Befreier*) to being a "hurter" (*Wehethäter*) by its revengefulness against the will to power. The point in this text is the same as made earlier in the "Tarantulas" chapter. They are poisonous spiders who want to hurt those who have power with their poison of revenge. The tarantulas will wreak vengeance and "abuse" (*Beschimpfung*) against all who are

not equal to them, meaning those above them in rank order of life and who are so because the higher rank means life can sacrifice itself in them and so the will to power can make life stronger. Against all that has power, the tarantulas will hurt by their revengefulness, “they want to hurt those who now have power with this” (*solchen wollen sie damit wehethun, die jetzt die Macht habe*).¹

Nietzsche's critique of the decadent's pitying is along these lines. Pity is con-

sidered a virtue only among decadents, (“*das Mitleiden heisst nur décadents eine Tugend*”) he tells us in (*Ecce Homo*, “Wise” § 4) why? Pity multiplies suffering, and the vengeful intent of the decadent in pitying the *wohlgeratener Mensch* is to get him to pity himself because of his suffering in self-overcoming, but that then multiplies his suffering making it all that much more difficult to endure so that the effort of will to power becomes overwhelmed and fails. That is the decadent's revenge and the reason why he pities. This is why pity for the *höhere Menschen* is Zarathustra's last temptation in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Part IV in the chapter “The Cry of Distress,” because they are those *wohlgeratene Menschen* on the path of will of power development and so are enduring that suffering. Zarathustra hears their cry of distress and is terrified upon hearing it because he is not sure he can pass the test they represent — the bet waged against him by the Soothsayer (Schopenhauer). The test is whether Zarathustra, like Nietzsche himself on the lowest rung on the ladder of life, will show mastery of revenge against the will-to-power agency they represent by controlling his compulsion to multiply their suffering by pitying them to and so cause will to power development in them to fail. He, on the lowest rung on the ladder of life, is confronted with life ascending in them, and the test is whether he will become revengeful in the face of the will to power growth in them and try to thwart it. If he passes he can prove that he is the true teacher of the new values of the revaluation: Not to pity. Pity is Machiavellian in its stratagems against the will to power; it is an antagonistic relationship to the *wohlgeratener Mensch* [27]. Coordinately, in his autobiographical introduction to what was to be his *Hauptwerk*, *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche states how pity had destructively intruded on him in three cases of will to power to speciation he found himself in and cites the cases by way of clarifying the autobiographical first-hand experience of the destructive meaning of pity and shedding light on Zarathustra in this particular

¹ As an instance of a revisionist reading, one might cite Babette Babich's argument that in the “Tarantulas” chapter. Zarathustra, she writes “is not arguing against social equality because he is against the idea but because the claim is impossible, corresponding to a shortsightedness that happens to be ideologically self-serving” [1, p. 123]. Babich's point is that Zarathustra does not oppose equality as an ideal and that his critique of the preachers of equality is only that they, knowing it is impossible, are being self-serving in preaching it nevertheless, and shortsighted so the ideal of equality, shared by Zarathustra in Babich's reading, will not come to be; whence their self-servingness. But Zarathustra's critique of the preachers of equality is not merely that they are self-serving in defending equality ideology as inequality is impossible however much an ideal it may be. It is obvious that the critique is against the tarantulas' revengefulness against the agency of will to power in the agon that leads to inequality and hierarchy, *Rangordnung* of life. The tarantula bites Zarathustra as he praises the inequality to come of the god-like struggle in the agon; his critique is of their revengefulness against will to power agency manifested in the agon, which they are power struggling with to tyrannize over it and thwart its efficacy. This is a recurring theme in Nietzsche's writings: the agon is limited to the aristocracy, in some sense a ‘nobility,’ and the decadent strikes vengefully against it. Zarathustra is their opposite as he will not whirl with revenge from being bitten by the tarantulas and “dance the tarantella,” suggesting he will persist instead in pursuing the very non-ideal inequality of the godlike striving in the agon. There is no sense at all in the section that Zarathustra is lukewarm about the inequality of the agon as an unavoidable course. He rejects the tarantula's moral framework entirely — not out of neutrality, but as himself a *wohlgeratener Mensch* who affirms the agonistic culture for an elite group and the suffering necessitated by the will to power in growing in power and strengthening aliveness (they are the same). That is what has to be affirmed as worthy of recurrence. The text leaves no room for Babich's ambiguity: the tarantulas are venomous enemies of life's differential forces, not misguided idealists. Babich's revisionism distorts Nietzsche's core critique, substituting ideological convenience for philosophical rigor. Her interpretation risks sanitizing Nietzsche into a liberal pluralist, and is Western ideological overwriting of what the text plainly says in a commonsense reading.

[21, p. 223].¹ It is absurd to call the decadent/*wohlgeratener Mensch* antagonism an “agonistic” relationship and not a deadly adversarial one.² Because it is adversarial, the “Great Politics” cannot be reduced to democracy because the relationship of the decadent to the will to power is a war to the death against it.³

It is challenging for the *wohlgeratener Mensch* to tolerate the added layer of suffering the *kleiner Mensch* introduces, and that is why it is so difficult to will his recurrence. This is Zarathustra’s abyssal thought in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part III “The Convalescent”; he is so downcast because the *kleiner Mensch* cannot be affirmed but Zarathustra cannot afford *not* to affirm him either. This is the paradox that so preoccupies Zarathustra for those seven days. All his labor to carry together and compose what is “fragment, riddle

and dreadful accident into “*Eines Dichtes*” (“*dass ich in Eins dichte und zusammen-trage, was Bruchstück ist und Rätsel und grauser Zufall*”) [20, p. 251] on behalf of humanity is being opposed by the very humanity his labor is meant to save! Hard to stay positive. But, in the broad-most scheme of things, even the *kleiner Mensch* must be willed to recur as he is part of the great process of evolution in understanding itself, and his intrusiveness against our attempts affirm willing the suffering of evolving is itself something that must be acknowledged as necessary. That is why the *höhere Menschen* must will the recurrence of revengefulness against their own will to power agency, if they can. Paying close attention to this context, we note that it is not truly affirmative of the decadent in the sense of valuing him, but is a matter of having no choice but to affirm him. But this is not an agonistic affirmation of the value of the decadent as the revised democratic but still liberal reading of the oppositional structure of decadent/*wohlgeratener Mensch* in Nietzsche’s thinking would have it. Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence is not a revisit of Kant’s moral law — that we must affirm the “small man” as a moral imperative [4; 10; 11]. Those readings do not penetrate into the paradox of the seven days and nights Zarathustra lay downcast, which, it is noteworthy, even his animals could not understand. But what if that affirmation became impossible, as this thinking is not normative but entirely practical? What if the decadent were poised to ensure that humanity flounders? Then we would have to settle for less than perfect affirmativeness, and that is the thought that ushers in the idea of the “Great Politics” against him. It is an essentially antagonistic relationship, and if the decadent shows signs of winning it, his destructiveness so great and so intolerably burdensome an overlay to the *wohlgeratene Menschen*, then he will have to be curtailed by any means necessary. It is not an agonistic relationship in which the decadent is affirmed for his role in the overall well being come of struggle. That is fantasy Nietzsche. That Zarathustra can will the recurrence of the

¹ Nietzsche wrote to Paul Deussen that in *Ecce Homo*, “light is first shed” on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Letter to Paul Deussen November 26, 1888) [18, vol. 8, p. 1159].

² The following writers — Herman Siemens, Vasti Roodt, William E. Connolly, David Owen, Keith Ansell-Pearson, Alan Schrift, Lawrence Hatab, and Cris-ta Davis Acampora, among others — have worked on the theory of the agonistic as a foundation for a conception of democracy to replace of consensus, interpreting Nietzsche’s oppositional structures as agonistic rather than antagonistic. While I recognize that we cannot get along without a concept of a Nietzschean extension, I do not believe that it is a legitimate extension in this case, as the key oppositional structure in Nietzsche’s thinking is that he is the opposite of the decadent as the *wohlgeratener Mensch*, and this opposition is unambiguously antagonistic, and consistently so up to the point of the “Great Politics” against him. The agon is confined to the new nobility, and the decadent is the moralizing tyrant seeking to revengefully thwart will to power agency from growing in power by the agon by imposing an order of equality. These are the facts of the texts.

³ See Nietzsche’s stark reckoning of the matter: “The psychologist should also think that in no circumstances is the defenselessness, the lack of protection of a great life, any greater [than the moment when I suffer from the immensity of my destiny]; that whenever there are any means at all to slay humans who are destinies, the instinct of poisonous the flies gives away these means. There can be no battle with the puny when one has greatness...consequently, what is puny becomes master,” Nietzsche [21, p. 604]; cited without Nietzsche’s deletions. Nietzsche saw our hatred and despising of will to power successes at the rupture event of speciation and we must ask how it came to be, and that is not a philosophical question about values but an empirical question of evolutionary psychology.

kleiner Mensch is an absolute triumph, but in what philosophical fantasy world is that a triumph of a kind of morality or a new value? It has always been a “value,” that is a non-thought. The issue is that no one could do it, until Nietzsche, whence his ethos appeal that he alone can first confront us with the “heaviest demand” (*schwersten Forderung*) in *Ecce Homo*, “Wise” § 1.

Nietzsche’s “Great Politics” is squarely aimed at the eradication of decadence, a life-denying force that opposes the will to power and perpetuates humanity’s decline.¹ This is evolutionary thinking, and the background claim being made is that life is on a declining path in our species. We must ask how this could be happening. Why would a species attack the success of life in itself? Where does decadence come from? While some philosophers remain trapped within the circle that truth-telling is *a priori* virtuous — that the decadent lies about the world by his good and evil because he lacks the ruthless honesty to tell the truth, and that, accordingly, the revaluation of values means embracing “*nuda veritas*” as the highest virtue — one would prefer an explanation more empirically enriched than such a philosophical one, which can give only a circular and meaningless answer to the question I am raising.

The origins question about decadence naturally refers itself to our catastrophic history and its effects today. Recent scientific discoveries about epigenetic inheritance can provide a new perspective on Nietzsche’s ideas. Ancestral trauma could be a non-human, life-based factor that ex-

plains what Nietzsche saw that he thought was such a profound threat to human flourishing. For Nietzsche’s critique of decadence to be more than idiosyncratic, it must be grounded in a scientific explanation of how decadence emerged and why it is a problem. My thesis is that the psychopathology of revengefulness against will to power agency and creative suffering is rooted in epigenetic trauma from near-extinction events — heritable changes in gene expression caused by environmental catastrophes. This hypothesis situates Nietzsche’s thought within a broader evolutionary and historical framework and justifies some general form of Nietzsche’s “Great Politics.”

Epigenetic trauma refers to the transmission of stress responses across generations through mechanisms such as DNA methylation and histone modification. Studies of transgenerational inheritance (e.g., the Dutch Hunger Winter) show how environmental stressors can alter gene expression, affecting behavior and cognition in descendants. Applied to Nietzsche’s critique of decadence, this could suggest that humanity’s “ill-will” against the will to power may be the result of epigenetic changes imprinted by near-extinction events that caused speciation paralysis, or perhaps just to cognizing stasis and that led to trying to universalize it into an ideology. That would be this theory’s understanding of his idea of the spiritualization of revenge. Exploration of a catastrophic past in recent history has been ongoing. By some accounts, a solar flare occurred some 14,300 years ago, a so-called “Miyake event,” and there are also accounts of a catastrophic comet impact, evidenced in an iridium boundary layer, the YDB, which dates from a few thousand years later at 12,800. There is room for the hypothesis that the people who founded modern civilization had been imprinted with trauma from climate catastrophe. A remnant population would have appeared with changes to DNA expression imprinted and preserved by epigenetic mechanisms until today in a reinforcement loop one to the other, so-called “gene-culture co-evolution.” In that case, the traumatic

¹ Nietzsche’s “Great Politics” in *Ecce Homo*, the *Nachlaß*, and his late letters is a radical, transformative, and future-oriented project that goes well beyond the institutional or cultural reforms discussed by Hugo Drochon in his book [7]. While Drochon’s book is a significant contribution, it does not sufficiently grapple with the depth and extremity of Nietzsche’s late political vision, especially as articulated in the unpublished notes and correspondence of 1888-1889. Any serious engagement with Nietzsche’s political thought must take these late writings as central, not peripheral, to understanding what Nietzsche meant by “Great Politics” The later writings reveal Nietzsche’s ambition for a politics that transcends the nation-state, aiming at a reconfiguration of humanity itself — ideas that are only partially addressed in Drochon’s analysis.

condition was never truly overcome and adaptation to it was conserved as psychopathology became culture.¹ Of course, this would have to have been built on top of an already existing trauma associated with speciation, which may be native to it. Modifications such as DNA methylation, histone modifications, and micro RNA expression imprinted on our epigenome from environmental stress could affect the expression of genes involved in the synthesis, release, and regulation of key hormones. The data we have today about transgenerational epigenetic heritability of trauma study localized trauma, and from these studies, there does seem to be limits to how far those effects go on. But trauma from a near-extinction event might be entirely different in kind, and maybe epigenetic modifications of trauma induced in those situations do make permanent changes in our genome. We do not know how the epigene responds to near-extinction events that threaten survival, but the likelihood is that it kicks in very strongly. Environmental stress from cataclysms such as those identified above could follow a route of epigenetic modification into the brain and be traced to the formation of a culture of vengefulness against the will to power as the force of our speciation event. While speculative, the idea that mass trauma could have contributed to the development of such an aberrant feature is a compelling area of study. It highlights the complex interplay between environmental stressors, collective trauma, and societal development. Anti-speciation psychopathology was reinforced and became the culture of misfortune and guilt as Nietzsche studied it. Connecting these dots is the profitable future of the empirical lines of study Nietzsche opened up. Such a study would ground Nietzsche's antagonistic thinking in empirical fact, and rescue it from being merely an anachronistic elitism or a

philosophy of values. It would also give some concretion to the idea of values in Nietzsche if values follow speciation and do not come before as the cause of it.² After all, the idea that the *Übermensch* is the result of a new theory of values is circular, but the statement that the values that support speciation — there is only one set — should, in some non-moral sense of “should” replace the spiritualization of revenge is coherent thinking. The upshot of this discussion is that the transfiguration of the world Nietzsche is talking about is a transfiguration of it from the hatred and despising of the will to power by the decadent because of will to power's exercise in the act of speciation as rupture, and speciation is our *ur-issue*, and now we have a culture of the spiritualization of revenge against it which arose in empirical history. It is clear that Nietzsche was talking about a body of knowledge about ourselves — knowledge of the meaning of life's creative sacrifice for power, knowledge of how will to power is to achieve mastery of that creative suffering and grow stronger against it. I have added to his idea of such a body of knowledge with my speculations about how the hatred and despising of will-to-power successes inclining towards a new speciation might have appeared. All of this as empirical content it seems to me, is what was meant to be understood as the knowledge foundation of the transformed world of the “World of Truth.” It is on the basis of this body of knowledge about the great politics *against* life — the great *lebensfeindliche Politik* — to coin a term not explicitly to be found in Nietzsche's texts but Nietzschean still — that art first emerges, emblemizing the liberatory politics of its overthrow and negation. Art is not transformative in itself — that is not a meaningful thought in Nietzsche — it is a decontextualized reading, but meaningful only as it symbolizes the transformed world now directed toward a new goal,

¹ The Younger Dryas Impact Hypothesis (YDIH) is no longer considered fringe science. As of the time of this writing, it has garnered significant attention and support within the scientific community. However, it has not yet achieved settled science status, remaining a topic of ongoing debate and research as experts continue to evaluate the evidence and implications.

² Paul Loeb's idea that Nietzsche is calling for a new species of human, that he is himself an instance of such, that is defined by the revaluation of all values is a meaningless conception of speciation [15; 16]. Of all the 25,000 speciation events that occurred during the 200-million-year history of ammonoids not a single one resulted from a revaluation of values.

and that emblemization is the purpose of art.

The Aesthetic as Political: The Dionysian Future of Art

In *Ecce Homo*, “Books,” “Birth of Tragedy” in sections §3 and §4 we learn of the meaning of Dionysian tragedy, the meaning of the tragic pathos of joy in destruction, and are promised a Dionysian age of art following upon the wars of the “Great Politics.” The promised tragic age of music is set in the future and said future will be ushered in by the wars of the “Great Politics” that will bring about a *Zuviel des Lebens*. It will be fought by the “Party of Life,” and it will include the “relentless destruction” (*schonungslose Vernichtung*) of “everything degenerating and parasitical.” The “Great Politics” means kinetic warfare: “Life” Nietzsche writes, “is a consequence of war” [19, § 53].¹ *Ecce Homo*, “Wise” § 7 is

¹ The following texts would seem to call for real, i.e., kinetic, and not just spiritual warfare. Laurence Lampert’s binary either/or is unfaithful to Nietzsche’s thinking [12]. These are: [25, p. 238]; [19, § 126, 127]. Laurence Lampert cites this text: “war (but without gunpowder!) between different thoughts! and their armies!” [17, vol. 10, p. 515] [18, p. 53] in support of the idea that Nietzsche was not talking about real warfare. Also, there is this text from *Ecce Homo*, “It is war, but war without powder and smoke, without warlike attitudes, without pathos and contorted limbs—all these things would still be ‘idealism’” [21, p. 267-268], which would seem to support Lampert’s point, but I would question it still. The *Nachlaß* text cited by Lampert is from the fall of 1883. In the full context, the text refers to a new nobility. The reference is to an aristocratic community privileged to war. The text mentions the decadent, and it is clear that the engagement with the decadent is as per his usefulness to the aristocracy and not a kind of moral parity. A close reading of this text and comparison with other similar ones show that Lampert’s interpretation is not supported. A similar text occurs in *Ecce Homo*, “Books” *Dawn* [21, p. 173] where Nietzsche says that his critique of morality does not have the scent of powder but that one will find lovelier scents in it, suggesting that the “without powder and smoke” line does not mean without kinetic war but without a kind of idealistic warfare, full of pomp and fanfare. That is the actual rhetorical context of the “without powder and smoke” language, not as opposite in menacing to kinetic warfare. He says that the effect of the book (*Dawn*) follows like the following of an inference, not like a canon. Morality is destroyed as an inference after one has moved on afterward, which thought does not have an implication about how it is destroyed. This is metaphorical language and Lampert is off sides taking it to have

about Nietzsche’s warlikeness and as part of the “Great Politics” against the stasis culture of decadence, and it is a biocultural text.² A Dionysian state will emerge of a transformed humanity that went through these wars *but without suffering from them* (because they are transformed), and this line is emphasized in the text as being the point of the paragraph (“Books,” “Birth of Tragedy” § 4) [21].³ Because of the *Zuviel*

exclusionary meaning as he does to spiritual warfare. His spiritual war/kinetic war binary is a falsification, and the “Great Politics” is both.

² The point in the section, “Wise” § 7, that opponents must be equal, is sometimes read to support an agonistic reading of Nietzsche’s theme of warfare, but the thought of equality there is contextualized as opposition and it is specified that the opposition cannot be either from above, stronger, since you cannot win, nor from below, since you get nothing out of it. The point is that the opponent must be a psychological counter to my level of will to power, as otherwise there is no chance for will to power to develop from the conflict. War is a metaphor for speciation. This text cannot be reconstructed into a framework of moral parity as it confers nothing on the opponent beyond utility. The text of Nietzsche [17, vol. 10, p. 515] cited above in the previous footnote, is explicit on this point of *using* the decadent (*Die Entartenden*) and of its being his fit punishment to be used... and used up.

³ The translation of “*jene neue Partei des Lebens*” as ‘that new section of life’ in the Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche [21, p. 259] exemplifies a tendency in Western liberal Nietzsche scholarship to render politically charged terms in a more neutral register. The German ‘*Partei*’ means ‘party’ or ‘faction’, terms that carry a strong political and oppositional connotation. By translating it as a “section”, the revolutionary and militant dimension of Nietzsche’s call for a new cultural and philosophical movement is diminished. Furthermore, because “section of life” is a generic phrase, capitalizing it as “Section of Life” would seem arbitrary or even nonsensical in English — it doesn’t carry the weight or specificity of a proper noun like “Party of Life.” Thus, Diethel is almost compelled to use lowercase, further reducing the phrase’s impact and stripping away the visual and conceptual emphasis present in the original German. This choice is indicative of a broader pattern in some interpretations of Nietzsche, where the radical and unsettling aspects of his philosophy, especially his vision of a “Great Politics,” are downplayed in favor of more palatable readings. Such translations risk distorting Nietzsche’s intent, particularly in works like *Ecce Homo*, where he explicitly positions himself as a philosopher of the future and a proponent of new, life-affirming politics. In this context, Diethel’s translation, which is likely to become standard as in the CWFN edition, may inadvertently contribute to a domestication of Nietzsche’s project of “Great Politics,” aligning it with prevailing Western democratic sensibilities that Nietzsche himself sought to unmask as a reaction against the speciation rupture implied by

des Lebens these wars will bring about, the destruction will be in the context of a Dionysian joy in destruction. That pathos is the characteristic of the tragic age because these wars will signify only the inexhaustibility of life ("Books," "Birth of Tragedy" § 3) [21], but not all will know that. Only the highest types will feel the suffering of these wars as the necessary sacrifice of life for power, and that is why they do not themselves suffer from them. The same language as above from *Ecce Homo*, "Books," "Birth of Tragedy" § 4 appears in a *Nachlaß* text titled "The Great Politics" where he speaks of the "Great Politics," as being a creative force strong enough to cultivate humanity as a whole and higher things, including: "...merciless severity (*schonungsloser Härte*) against the degenerate and parasitic in life — against what corrupts, poisons, slanders, destroys to the ground, .. and sees in the destruction of life the mark of a higher kind of soul" (*My translation — T.S.*) [17, vol. 13, p. 25]

Dionysian wisdom is joy in destruction as knowledge of the inexhaustibility of life and recognition that the act of destruction is a testament to its inexhaustibility, that life can creatively sacrifice itself for power indefinitely and not run out. The destruction of life in the higher soul means creative destruction. When and only when that transformation happens can there first be a tragic age for music. The aesthetic is this same thought, sacrifice but without suffer-

the *Übermensch* — a new, emergent type of humanity rather than a singular individual. Other of Diethe's translation choices serve to make Nietzsche sound moronic, as if under the shadow of the breakdown to come — a portrayal which is certainly not the translator's role. In personal communication with me in May 15-17, 2025, Paul Loeb insisted that I first explain the philosophical significance of the mistranslation in the Stanford Nietzsche Complete Works, which he recognized, before acknowledging the issue, and he further accused me of being "obsessive and idiosyncratic" otherwise, as a professional shortfall — a rhetorical stance that exemplifies a Western scholarly culture where interpretive appropriations often precede and overshadow rigorous scientific reading of texts. This tendency to neutralize and domesticate Nietzsche's radical language through translation and scholarly gatekeeping is deeply unfortunate, as it obscures the original force and intent of his philosophical project. Reading what Nietzsche actually says would almost seem to be a *malum in se*.

ing from it because it is creative toward the *Zuviel des Lebens* brought by the will to power of new speciation. The political transformation Nietzsche envisions is brought about by means of the creative force of the "Great Politics" against the *lebensfeindliche Politik* of the decadent's renunciation of will to power, which he renounces because it means the sacrifice of life. The Dionysian age of art to follow will be founded on that grounds. There is no suggestion whatsoever that in the tragic age of art, art can be that transformational by itself, it is explicitly the force of the "Great Politics." Strong's reading of the transfiguration ignores Nietzsche's explicitly stated order.

In a late letter to George Brandes on his "Great Politics" [18, vol. 8, p. 1170] Nietzsche discusses how the current political formations of the day — he specifically mentions the Triple Alliance — will give way in the era of "Great Politics." He predicts that new power structures will emerge and fall into the hands of formations of individuals that oppose such. He says at the end of the letter that the wars of the "Great Politics" will be unlike any we have had, not like the wars of the small politics between race, nation, and class, which are "absurd divisions" (*absurden Grenzen*) and so, by implication, the wars fought in such formations are absurd wars, as, in reality, there are no such orderings but only order of rank between one human being and another. So these individuals of higher rank will be the individuals who will come together in the opposed formation as the new power structure. The conception of the "Great Politics" supersedes any other conception of politics to be found in Nietzsche's writings, and works on his political thinking in the liberal West that ignore it are non-works on that subject.

In a *Nachlaß* text, Nietzsche speaks of formations of "singular full-of-value individuals" (*einzelnen werthvollen Individuen*) [17, vol. 12, p. 296]. The so-called "Party of Life" is not a mass movement in the conventional sense, but rather a movement of singular individuals in whom the revaluation of values is already realized

and who, as if ignited by a spark from the masses, emerge as its exemplars. The idea that the revaluation is a universal or accessible process fundamentally misrepresents Nietzsche's vision. The revaluation is not a democratizing force, but a radical rupture that only a select few — those capable of enduring the demands of speciation and transformation — can realize. It is a hierarchical and exclusive event, not a collective or democratic one.

The revaluation of values is neither a private, individual affair nor a mass movement in the sense of universal participation. Rather, it is the work of a new elite, the "Party of Life," within the framework of "Great Politics," who embody and enact the new values for our species. The point of combating nihilism is not because there is some new value of "good" in doing so. As Nietzsche said, he would rather be a satyr than a saint: the revaluation is the force of life itself, brazen and profane, a rupture of speciation. Nihilism is not morally "opprobrious"; it is meaningless to say so. It is, rather, bizarre, absurd, or even psychopathic. How could a politics against life be "immoral"? How could a politics for life be "moral"? These are outworn philosophical templates being imposed on thinking that is far ahead of where philosophy has ever been. This tedious trope of "affirm life" has persisted from Kaufmann through Reginster to Loeb. Speciation is not a moral imperative, and Nietzsche's emphasis is not on affirming it but on coming to terms with the fact of extinction if we renounce it, as mostly we do and go even further by spreading renunciation. Not all members of the parent lineage speciate — otherwise there would be no need for it. This is a fundamental principle in evolutionary biology and it is basic to a radical interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy.

In the "Sublime Ones" chapter, Nietzsche makes the distinction between the sublime and the beautiful and allows for the transition from the formless movement of the sublime to a bounded rest. The bounded rest of the beautiful one, the "Over-hero" has a purpose, which is to call us to our destiny as becoming fore-

runners of the *Übermensch*. There we find a definition of the beautiful in terms of the Dionysian, which I here repeat: "When power becomes gracious and descends into the visible, that alone I would call beauty" [20, p. 230]. Power is manifested, and it is so because life is sacrificed and the creative will is being engaged. Knowledge of ourselves from life cutting into itself is now exercised over ourselves in mastery of intimate weakness, which mastery can be seen in the beautiful.

We find a coordinated definition of beauty in another chapter where Zarathustra asks: "What is beauty?" and answers: "Where I must will with all my will ... that an image may not remain a mere image" [20, p. 235]. The point is that I must will with all my will to the end what is a mere image before me, (namely myself as a self-that-is-overcome as per being *lebensfeindlich* towards creative will to power) can become *visible* in the sensible world. The sublime one is a warrior of knowledge, and in his warlike confrontations, he has learned ugly truths and even decks himself out in them, but that is not yet the adornment of beauty. The ugly truths he has learned regard himself and his revengefulness against the positive force of evolution to strengthen life in ourselves, the truth that we are too weak to know and too weak for the exercise of will to power over ourselves. Art is essentially predicated on the efforts of the warrior for a knowledge and a "World of Truth" that the mendacity of "the good and the just" would keep concealed. Art is essentially embedded in the wars of the "Great Politics" against the mendacity of the decadent. Knowledge is defiant as against the lying world of the decadent so that life strengthened is life that knows itself as strengthened and that then becomes seeable and feelable as so thought and known. What is thinkable, seeable, and feelable is the reality of speciation. The *Mehr an Leben* as will to power become *visible* becomes the source for the depiction of the overcome human of "fragment, riddle, and dreadful accident," overcome in the artwork, overcome in the sensible world. Eventually, it will become

the art of the *Übermensch*. But this is an esoteric knowledge, and not all are capable of engaging with it to come to *feel* the creative sacrifice of life cutting into itself as necessary and not reject it.

The *Mehr an Leben*, in which life becomes *visible* as aesthetic surplus, is promised only within the horizon of the "Great Politics" and the *Zuviel des Lebens*. The latter is linked to Nietzsche's thought of evolutionary progress, projected as the coming victory of the "Party of Life" over the *kleine Menschen* with their ill-will, their spirit of revenge against the will to power, and their resistance to the force of speciation. The sacrifice of life — yet without suffering, since it is transfigured by joy in both the *Mehr an Leben* and the *Zuviel des Lebens* to come — marks the wars of the "Great Politics" [21, p. 259]. The tragic pathos of joy in destruction comes from the recognition of the inexhaustibility of life in that it keeps doing this as its law of willing its own sacrifice to renew itself to become stronger, and without end. But not all can feel that the creative sacrifice of life as necessary, it is the mark and identity of the higher human being only. The "Great Politics" creates the transfiguration of the human race that will found a Dionysian age of art. Dionysian art serves the political and extends its order of rule, the rule of the "Party of Life" to bring the rule of the demos, the decadent/*kleine Menschen* to an end — just the opposite of the democratization by art even in its agonistic variant formulation. The idea that a rule of democracy is consistent with Nietzsche even in this variant form is untenable, and another conception of right to rule is needed and it is the rule of the law of speciation.

Not taking Nietzsche's texts seriously is more than a merely sporadic problem in Western liberal philosophical research into Nietzsche, and it calls into question just exactly what academic subject it is, as without that rudimentary standard of reading the writings of the author being studied, it is not properly an academic subject. It might be noted that Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap both engaged with Nietzsche, attempting to place him

on a more positivist footing and to push back against Heidegger's metaphysical readings at the time. Schlick's *Problems of Ethics* (originally published in 1930) is well-known for its naturalistic and psychological approach and scholars have noted the influence of Nietzsche in Schlick's project of naturalizing ethics. More to the point, Carnap, in "The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language," (1931) praised Nietzsche for "almost entirely avoiding" the confusion that he believed plagued metaphysics. Carnap saw Nietzsche as upholding the distinction between science (cognitive content) and poetry (non-cognitive expression), aligning with his own project of demarcating meaning from meaningless statements. But, Carnap's attempt to overcome metaphysics — exemplified by his critique of Heidegger and his praise for Nietzsche's non-metaphysical expression in that essay — did not succeed in dislodging later Heideggerian metaphysics from Nietzsche studies, continuing in the work of Paul Loeb [5; 28]. Finally, although not himself a positivist, Morris Lazerowitz had high regard for Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical stance [14].

Conclusion: Ideology and Nietzsche's Aesthetics

Some of Nietzsche's commentators have proposed that there are ideas in Nietzsche's writings indicating that he took the position that aesthetics can be a democratizing force in an agonistic variant of the idea of liberal democracy. This thinking is part of the more general tendency in Western liberal Nietzsche interpretation to impute democratic ideas to Nietzsche despite many texts that state precisely the opposite. But anti-democracy is not just to be found in Nietzsche's statements, it is deep in the thinking itself, and one locus of anti-democratic thinking is the idea that the "Great Politics" is requisite for the Dionysian age of art. The Dionysian age can only be ushered in by war waged by individuals who know that nihilism stems from lying about the reality of speciation but who can themselves

embrace the creative sacrifice of life for power that will to power exacts. More than a textual point, this role of knowledge is part of the architectonic of this thinking in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Part II, starting with the texts on knowledge and the will to power and leading to the discussion of the sublime and the beautiful in the “Sublime Ones” chapter. The transfiguration to come in the tragic age of art, the tragic pathos transposed into a philosophical pathos in the idea of the eternal recurrence, will transform the world from out of the spiritualization of revenge. Nietzsche thinks this is the most profound psychopathology the human race has ever fallen into, it is the subject of our “best reflection,” (ironically meant, of course) and that observation may be taken to calibrate just how far from the “World of Truth” we are about our nature as living beings and the rupture of speciation. We do not transform ourselves out of it by “accepting Nietzsche’s invitation” to do so, as Strong so naively suggests. If Nietzsche had thought his issuing an invitation would be graciously received, he would not have said that the “Great Politics” had to come first and had to include war against the decadent/*kleiner Mensch*. The Dionysian future for art Nietzsche envisioned is not a democratic or pluralist one, but a hierarchical and transformational order in which the aesthetic mirrors the political transformation as a deeply rooted biopolitics and an intrinsic order of rule of life, politics in no sense as we have ever understood politics before. Strong’s interpretation might emphasize how aesthetic forms (art, literature, myth) shape political realities, and that may be, but the fundamental order he is supposing is opposite to what is stated *Ecce Homo*, which although Strong acknowledged, he does not take to heart. I would say this order is in play earlier in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as well. Art is the afterward to that transfiguration by the “Great Politics” and it is hierarchizing of the human race in “a new order of rank of life” (*eine neue Rangordnung des Leben*), the highest rung reserved for those who know and can affirm that power is manifested only at the expense

of the sacrifice of life and is creative in that regard. Nietzsche never represented such knowledge and its exercise as possibly becoming a universal accomplishment of all human beings.

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«ВЕЛИКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА» НИЦШЕ И ЭСТЕТИЗАЦИЯ ВЛАСТИ: АНАЛИЗ ЭСТЕТИКО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ДИАЛЕКТИКИ В «ТАК ГОВОРИЛ ЗАРАТУСТРА»

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АННОТАЦИЯ

Поздняя эстетика Ницше — это не просто «искусство ради искусства», но неотъемлемая часть политического видения, которое он называет «Великой политикой», принципиально противостоящей либеральной демократии. В данной статье оспариваются доминирующие в западной философии интерпретации, приписывающие Ницше либерально-демократические взгляды. Вместо этого демонстрируется, что его философия предполагает непримиримую войну против всех аутсайдеров. Эта война отвергает демократический идеал всеобщего равноправия, даже в том варианте, где агонистическая борьба может принести какие-то улучшения.

Дионисийский век искусства, положивший начало этой войне, связан с людьми, которые принимают творческую жертву, требуемую волей к власти, противостоят нигилизму, признавая его морализаторской ложью о том, что страдание — это «наказание» (Lügenwort), а вину искупить нельзя. Ницше считает, что это противоречит способности человечества к эволюционному развитию. Его концепция трагического пафоса начинается как эстетический опыт — художественное утверждение страдания — но затем философски трансформируется в пафос вечного возвращения, преобразуя эстетический аффект в знание. Усвоение этого знания не является универсальной способностью. Политические последствия этой трансформации бросают вызов принципам либеральной демократии. Данные взгляды Ницше перекликаются с современными политическими течениями, которые рассматривают конфликт как необходимое условие культурного и политического обновления. Эти взгляды объединяют эстетику, политику и философию Ницше, поэтому их ре-интерпретация, предпринятая в статье, вносит значительный вклад в ницшеанские исследования, эстетику и политическую теорию.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА

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КОНФЛИКТ ИНТЕРЕСОВ

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